Rethinking Subsidiarity in the European Union Legal Order for South Asian Regional Cooperation: A Theoretical Exploration Through Economic and Contractual Approaches to International Law

Abstract

The European Union (EU) was formed by the member states in consequences of their contract to shoulder up each other in a collective fashion for the furtherance of their inter alia economic, social and political purposes. It is after each and every member which now forms part of the union consented that the EU started to function. The treaty forming the EU incorporates a very important principle that occupies a central position within the constitutional architecture regarding the balancing of powers between the member states and the organs of the EU. That principle is known by the name of subsidiarity. It is this principle which regulates the relationship of member states and the organs of the EU rooted in the broader logic of multilevel governance in a harmonized way as the member states were not of the opinion for over-centralization of the EU thereby depriving themselves of their sovereign-ties in favor of the EU. By adopting a mixed-method approach adjoined with doctrinal study, this work offers a critical examination of this principle in order to evaluate its potential applicability within the context of South-Asian regional cooperation by analyzing the principle of subsidiarity in the light of contractual and economic theories of international law. The findings suggest that this principle enhances institutional equilibrium and promotes democratic accountability but at the same time it simultaneously embodies structural tensions between centralization and decentralization. However, its successful transplantation would depend on political will, maturity, and normative convergence. In the final analysis, subsidiarity is best conceptualized not only as a legal concept, but also as an adaptive governance concept that is capable of mediating competing claims to sovereignty and efficiency.